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Abstract
This paper uses nationally-representative data from the PSID and CDS to estimate the
causal effects of two parent socialization actions on children’s charitable giving. We develop a
framework that shows how different identifying assumptions about parental response to time-
varying unobserved child heterogeneity can be combined with the child fixed effects estimate
and the difference over time between siblings estimate to infer a bound on the causal effect of
a parental socialization action. Under the identifying assumption we think is most reasonable,
our estimates imply that talking to children about giving raises the probability that children
give by at least .13. We find no evidence that parental role-modeling affects children’s giving,
except among non-African-American girls. The results have implications for raising charitable
children, and suggest that translational research is needed to learn how role-modeling, known
to be effective in the laboratory, can be used effectively in the home.
1
1 Introduction
Little is known about the effects of actions parents take to socialize their children to give to charity.
Although an extensive experimental literature from developmental psychology has established the
existence of causal effects of role-modeling and verbal socialization on children’s giving in laboratory
settings (Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad 2006), there is little empirical evidence about the existence
and magnitude of causal effects from nationally-representative data collected from children’s home
settings. Lacking this evidence, it is not known whether parents are effectively using either role-
modeling or verbal socialization to raise charitable children.
In this paper we provide the first estimates of the causal effects of role-modeling and verbal
socialization that use nationally-representative data from children in their home settings. Using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics’ (PSID) 2001-2007 waves and its Child Devel-
opment Supplement (CDS) 2002 and 2007, we estimate models of whether or not children give
to charity, in which the main explanatory variables are the role-model of whether their parents
give and whether their parents talk to them about giving. We estimate individual and sibling
fixed effects specifications and two additional specifications seldom considered: across-time sibling
fixed effects (older sibling data collected at an earlier time is differenced from younger sibling
data collected at a later time) and a difference over time between siblings estimator. Estimates
from these specifications identify causal effects depending upon the assumptions one makes about
how parents’ socialization actions respond to children’s unobserved prosocial endowments. As is
well-known, the sibling fixed effects estimator is consistent for the causal effect if parent socializa-
tion actions neither compensate nor reinforce differences between the child’s specific endowment
and his sibling’s specific endowment (Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994; Rosenzweig and
Wolpin 1995; Ermisch and Francesconi 2001). The individual fixed effects estimator is consistent
regardless of parental response to the child-specific prosocial endowment, as long as the child’s
unobserved environment is time-constant.
However, it is hard to defend the assumption that the unobserved environment is time-constant
in the child development context. If the parent’s socialization actions respond to time-varying
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changes in the child’s prosocial environment then the individual fixed effects estimator is no longer
consistent. The difference over time between siblings estimator would be consistent as long as
parental socialization neither compensates nor reinforces within-sibling differences that arise be-
cause of time-varying changes in the children’s idiosyncratic environments. In this way, identifying
assumptions about compensation/reinforcement reappear despite the use of child fixed effects.
Maintaining that parents neither compensate nor reinforce within-sibling changes in environments
is a strong identifying assumption.
In the paper we show how different identifying assumptions about compensation/reinforcement
and substitution/complementarity, constructs from the intra-household allocation (Becker and
Tomes 1976) and cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier 2011) literatures, can be combined with
the child fixed effects estimate and the difference over time between siblings estimate to infer a
bound on the causal effect of parental action to socialize their children to give to charity. Which
of the two estimates is interpreted as the bound depends upon qualitative assumptions about
compensation/reinforcement and substitution/complementarity. Some combinations of identify-
ing assumptions can be ruled out (e.g., reinforcement plus substitution) because they are incom-
patible with the estimates. Other assumptions (e.g., complementarity) may be given less weight
because they counter much thinking in the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission
literatures. In any event our results about the relationship between intra-household allocation
and cultural transmission assumptions, the biases they imply, and our estimates narrow the range
of causal interpretations about the effects of parental actions to socialize their children’s giving.
Our identification approach is generally applicable to empirical analyses using cross-time varia-
tion and cross-sibling variation to estimate the effects of a wide variety of parental investments
to achieve child outcomes, and points to the kind of data needed to further narrow the range of
causal interpretations in such analyses.
3
2 Background
An extensive experimental literature in which adult experimenters role-model giving and/or talk
about giving suggests that these are effective actions parents can take to socialize children’s giving.1
Accordingly, role-modeling and talking to children about giving are emphasized in the practical
literature on raising charitable children (Gallo and Gallo 2001; Weisman 2006). Despite this
consensus, it is not known whether role-modeling and verbal socialization, effective in laboratory
settings, are being effectively used in the home (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989, p. 156). Furthermore,
because the experimental results are based on small, relatively homogeneous samples, generaliza-
tion to the population has not been established. To our knowledge the only work at the population
level are cross-sectional results that both parental role-modeling and verbal socialization have large
associations with children’s giving money to charities (Brown, Srivastava, and Taylor 2012; Ottoni-
Wilhelm, Estell, and Perdue 2011). These results provide initial evidence that causal effects seen
in the laboratory may extend to home settings and generalize to the population, but it is not
known how much of these cross-sectional associations are due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Standard approaches to mitigating unobserved heterogeneity include individual fixed effects
and sibling fixed effects models. Most previous papers using sibling fixed effects are not explicitly
investigating parental investment in children, and therefore do not use a conceptual framework
based on intra-household allocation (e.g., Altonji and Dunn 1996a, 1996b; Geronimus and Koren-
man 1992). However, a standard conceptual framework in the parental investment literature is
Becker and Tomes’ (1976) intra-household allocation model. The Becker-Tomes model posits that
a parent’s investment in her children responds to differences in child-specific endowments either
1For examples of role-modeling experiments, see Bryan and Walbek (1970), Dressel and Midlarsky (1978), Grusec,
Sass-Kortsaak, and Simutis (1978), Israel and Raskin (1979), Owens and Ascione (1991), Rice and Grusec (1975),
Rushton (1975), White and Burnam (1975); cf. Lipscomb, Bregman, and McAllister (1983). For experiments that
involve talking about donating, see Dlugokinski and Firestone (1974), Dressel and Midlarsky (1978), Eisenberg-
Berg and Geisheker (1979), Grusec, Sass-Kortsaak, and Simutis (1978), Israel and Brown (1979), Israel and Raskin
(1979), McGrath, Wilson, and Frasetto (1995), Perry, Bussey, and Freiberg (1981), Rice and Grusec (1975), Smith,
Leinbach, Stewart, and Blackwell (1983); cf. Bryan and Walbek (1970), Lipscomb, Bregman, and McAllister (1983).
This list is not exhaustive, see Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad (2006) and the earlier Eisenberg and Fabes (1998)
for authoritative reviews. Results from the role-modeling experiments are robust across most of the experiments,
while results from the talking-about-donating experiments are somewhat more mixed.
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by compensating for those differences (investing more in the less endowed child) or by reinforcing
the differences (investing more in the more endowed child). Under the identifying assumption
that parental investment is neutral–neither compensating nor reinforcing differences between chil-
dren’s specific endowments–sibling fixed effects specifications consistently estimate causal effects
of parental investment. Because neutrality is a strong assumption, the utility of sibling fixed
effects models in this situation can be questioned (Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994;
Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1995; also see Ermisch and Francesconi 2001, pp. 263ff). Individual fixed
effects would seem preferable because they yield consistent estimates of causal effects regardless of
whether parents compensate or reinforce child-specific endowments, under the identifying assump-
tion that other unobserved heterogeneities that are correlated with parental investments, such as
the child-specific environment, is time-constant.
A problem with individual fixed effects applied to children during the childhood years is that
the child development literature calls into question the assumption that child-specific environments
are time-constant. As the child ages, the child-specific environment changes through encounters
with formal institutions (child-care, schools, neighborhood organizations, religious congregations,
media) and informal networks (friends, neighbors), and parents would likely respond to these
changes (Berk 2003; Bisin and Verdier 2011). In our application changes in the child-specific
environment can lead to changes in the child’s unobserved prosocial values that in turn affect giving.
The term “environment” is more familiar to economists, and we will use this term synonymously
with “prosocial values.” It is well-known that prosocial values change as children age (Eisenberg
1986).
Becker and Tomes (1979, p. 1167) use now standard “family income” reasoning to argue that
parents invest less in children when child-specific environments (“endowment luck” in their ter-
minology) increase. This kind of parental substitution in response to changes in environments is
akin to “cultural substitution” from the cultural transmission literature (Bisin and Verdier 2011).
Mapping these constructs to our charitable giving application, “parental investment” is action
taken to socialize children to give (“vertical transmission”) and changes in child-specific prosocial
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values come about through encounters with formal institutions and informal networks that also
socialize giving (“horizontal transmission”). Bisin and Verdier (2001) show that if parental social-
ization and horizontal socialization are substitutes then the outcome being socialized will become
heterogeneous in the population; alternatively if parental and horizontal socialization are strong
enough cultural complements the outcome being socialized will become homogeneous. The fact
that charitable giving is heterogeneous in the population suggests that parental and horizontal
socializations are cultural substitutes, or at least any cultural complementarity is not strong.2 If
parental actions to socialize children’s giving and horizontal socialization are cultural substitutes
then child fixed effects estimator of the effect of parental actions would be downward biased.
A potential approach to mitigating the bias created by time-varying child-specific prosocial
values is to model the unobservable with a child-specific trend. This approach requires at least
three observations per child across time, a requirement not satisfied by the data available for
many studies, including ours. Alternatively, the availability of sibling data permits the mod-
eling of a family-specific trend: the “difference over time between siblings” estimator (Levine,
Gustafson, and Velenchik 1997). While this estimator differences out unobserved time-varying
environment that is common to both siblings, it also re-introduces in a time-varying context the
compensation/reinforcement constructs from the intra-household allocation model. Hence both
the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission models are necessary to understand the
differences in potential biases between the child fixed effects and the difference over time between
siblings estimators. Previous work has not derived the differences in potential biases.
The present paper derives the differences in biases under different qualitative identifying as-
sumptions about compensation/reinforcement and cultural substitution/complementarity. Our
empirical work shows that knowledge of these differences combined with the child fixed effects and
difference over time between siblings estimates can be used to infer a bound on the causal effect
of a parental socialization action. This is similar in spirit to the approach developed by Ribar
(1999) in which a qualitative identifying assumption about the relationship between the child-
2Based on our calculations using the PSID, in calendar years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 the percent of
the American population who give was always in the range 65 to 69.
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specific covariance (between the unobserved child-specific endowments in the outcome equation
and the “action” equation) and cross-sibling covariance combined with the sibling fixed effects and
sibling IV estimates suggest bounds on causal effects. Our innovations relative to Ribar’s work
are deriving the identifying assumptions in terms of the intra-household allocation and cultural
transmission models, a framework that is well suited to study the effects of parental investments
on children’s outcomes, and modeling time-varying heterogeneity.
3 Econometric Framework and Identification Problem
We investigate the effect of parental socialization actions on children’s charitable giving using a
model similar to that in Behrman et al. (1994), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995), and Ermisch and
Francesconi (2001). Using this framework we analyze the identification problem that arises in the
presence of time-varying heterogeneity. Consider a model of charitable giving Yijt for child i in
family j at time t:
Yijt = βXijt + µj + αij + θijt + vijt, (1)
where Xijt is the parent’s socialization action. There are four variables in (1) that model different
components of a child’s unobserved heterogeneity that affects a child’s giving: µj is a family-
specific time-constant prosocial endowment that is common to all members of the family j (e.g.,
due to genetic similarity); αij is a child-specific prosocial endowment; θijt models time-varying
idiosyncratic prosocial values; and vijt models random shocks to the child’s giving. The difference
between θijt and vijt is that in our model, parental socialization action will respond to θijt but not
to vijt. The object of estimation is parameter β, the effect of socialization action on children’s
giving. In our empirical work we consider two socialization actions: talking about giving and
role-modeling, but in this section, to ease discussion we develop the model in terms of one action,
e.g. talking about giving. For a two-child family, sibling k’s outcome equation parallels (1):
Ykjt = βXkjt + µj + αkj + θkjt + vkjt. (2)
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Because the parental socialization decisions are made within a family context, the socialization
variables Xijt and Xkjt are themselves functions of family-related and child-related unobservables:
Xijt = γ1αij + γ2αkj + δµj + pi1θijt + pi2θkjt + uijt (3)
and
Xkjt = γ1αkj + γ2αij + δµj + pi1θkjt + pi2θijt + ukjt (4)
where uijt and ukjt model random socialization shocks unrelated to children’s endowments and
idiosyncratic prosocial values. The parameters γ1, γ2, δ, pi1, and pi2, model the idea that there
is unobserved heterogeneity across families and across children common to both children’s giving
behavior and parent’s socialization decisions. As is well-known, unless all these parameters are
zero, estimating (1) across children with heterogeneous µj, αij, and θijt is inconsistent for the
causal effect β.
In equations (3) and (4), δ is the effect of the family-specific prosocial endowment on parent’s
socialization of both children. Two parameters model the parent’s socialization responses to the
child’s own specific prosocial endowment (γ1) and his sibling’s specific prosocial endowment (γ2).
Similarly pi1 and pi2 model socialization responses to the own and sibling idiosyncratic time-varying
prosocial values. Own and sibling endowments and prosocial values are drawn from the same
distribution so that var(αij) = var(αkj) and var(θijt) = var(θkjt). Likewise, own and sibling
random shocks to giving are drawn from the same distribution so that var(vijt) = var(vkjt), as are
the random socialization shocks var(uijt) = var(ukjt).
To see the identification problems associated with different model specifications, we derive the
expressions for the observed variances of children’s charitable giving and parent’s socialization
actions and their covariances within child over time and across siblings in terms of the parameters
of the model. After substituting equations (3) and (4) into (1) and (2) to obtain the reduced form
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for Y , the within-child across-time expressions are:
∆TYij = (1 + βpi1)(θijt − θijt−1) + βpi2(θkjt − θkjt−1) + β(uijt − uijt−1) + (vijt − vijt−1) (5)
and
∆TXij = pi1(θijt − θijt−1) + pi2(θkjt − θkjt−1) + (uijt − uijt−1). (6)
where ∆T indicates that the difference is taken in the time dimension.





















The child fixed effects estimator bT is (8) divided by (7) and its probability limit is:












bT is consistent if σ2θ = 0 or pi1 = 0: the child-specific prosocial values do not vary over time, or if
they do, the parental socialization action does not respond to them.
The within-sibling difference expressions are:
∆JYit = (1 +βγ1−βγ2)(αij−αkj) + (1 +βpi1−βpi2)(θijt− θkjt) +β(uijt−ukjt) + (vijt− vkjt) (10)
and
∆JXit = (γ1 − γ2)(αij − αkj) + (pi1 − pi2)(θijt − θkjt) + (uijt − ukjt). (11)
where ∆J indicates that the difference is taken within sibling pairs at time t. The corresponding
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variance and covariance terms are:
var(∆JXit) = 2(γ1 − γ2)2σ2α + 2(pi1 − pi2)2σ2θ + 2σ2u (12)
and
cov(∆JYit,∆
JXit) = 2(1 + βγ1 − βγ2)(γ1 − γ2)σ2α + 2(1 + βpi1 − βpi2)(pi1 − pi2)σ2θ + 2βσ2u. (13)
The sibling fixed effects estimator bJ is (13) divided by (12), and its probability limit is:
plim bJ = β +
(γ1 − γ2)σ2α + (pi1 − pi2)σ2θ
(γ1 − γ2)2σ2α + (pi1 − pi2)2σ2θ + σ2u
. (14)
Assuming σ2α and σ
2
θ are not zero, b
J is consistent if γ1− γ2 = 0 and pi1−pi2 = 0. We will interpret
these identifying assumptions below.
If we take the difference over time between siblings, it can be shown that the estimator bJT
has:
plim bJT = β +
(pi1 − pi2)σ2θ
(pi1 − pi2)2σ2θ + σ2u
. (15)
Finally, we can construct a within-sibling estimator for β by taking the difference between the
older sibling measured at an earlier time and the younger sibling measured at a later time. The
resulting estimator bJDT can be shown to have:
plim bJDT = β +
(γ1 − γ2)σ2α + pi1σ2θ
(γ1 − γ2)2σ2α + (pi21 + pi22)σ2θ + σ2u
. (16)
We turn now to the interpretation of the biases in (9) and (15) using constructs from the intra-
household allocation (Becker and Tomes 1976) and cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier 2011)
models. We focus on the bT and bJT estimators because our empirical results indicate that ̂γ1 − γ2 =
0, and conditional on γ1 − γ2 = 0: plim bJDT = plim bT and plim bJ = plim bJT . Conditioning on
γ1 − γ2 = 0 also allows us to focus on the innovation in our analysis: the idiosyncratic time-
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varying prosocial values and the associated response parameters pi1 and pi2. Figure 1 summarizes
how each (pi1, pi2) pair maps to qualitative assumptions about parental (a) compensation-versus-
reinforcement in response to changes in the difference between children’s prosocial values and
(b) substitution-versus-complementarity in response to changes in the sum of children’s prosocial
values, and maps these assumptions to the directions and relative magnitudes of the biases in the
bT and bJT estimators.
The pi2 = pi1 line partitions the pi1, pi2 plane such that to the northwest are (pi1, pi2) pairs corre-
sponding to parental compensation and to the southeast are pairs corresponding to reinforcement.
For example, if pi1 > 0, pi2 > 0, and pi2 > pi1, in response to a one-unit exogenous increase in
child i’s prosocial values the parent would increase talking to child i by pi1 but also would increase
talking to child k by pi2 so that ∆
T (Xijt −Xkjt) = pi1 − pi2 < 0: the parent talks relatively more
to child k who did not experience the increase in prosocial values, hence compensating child k.
Conversely, if pi1 > 0, pi2 < 0 then ∆
T (Xijt − Xkjt) = pi1 − pi2 > 0: the parent talks relatively
more to child i thereby reinforcing the exogenous change in prosocial values that favored child i. If
pi2 = pi1 the parent is unresponsive (“neural”) to within-sibling heterogeneity in θ. pi2 = pi1 implies
equation (3) can be re-written as:
Xijt = γ1(αij + αkj) + δµj + pi1(θijt + θkjt) + uijt (3’)
where we recall that the discussion is conditional on γ1 − γ2 = 0.
Equation (3’) makes plain an interesting interpretation of the identifying assumptions behind
sibling fixed effects models: the assumptions permit a parental response to the sum total of her
children’s endowments, and to the sum total of prosocial values, but not to the within-sibling
differences. It is as if in making her socialization responses to endowments and prosocial values,
the parent uses her “average child” (meaning the average endowment and the average prosocial
values) to determine her socialization responses to both children. Consistency of the difference
over time between siblings estimator bJT does not require this identifying assumption in terms of
endowments (γ1 = γ2 is not necessary), but does require it in terms of prosocial values (pi2 = pi1 is
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necessary).
In a similar manner the pi2 = −pi1 line partitions the pi1, pi2 plane such that to the southwest
are (pi1, pi2) pairs corresponding to cultural substitution and to the northeast complementarity.
Recall that in the pi1 > 0, pi2 > 0, and pi2 > pi1 example above (northeast of the pi2 = −pi1 line),
although the parent responded by talking relatively more to child k, the parent talked more to
both children. Hence the parent complemented the exogenous increase in the sum total of her
children’s prosocial values by increasing the sum total of her talking about giving to children:
∆T (Xijt + Xkjt) = pi1 + pi2 > 0. If instead pi1 < 0, pi2 > 0, and pi2 < −pi1, then ∆T (Xijt + Xkjt) =
pi1 +pi2 < 0, the parent reduces the sum total amount of talking to her children, hence substituting
away from talking about giving.
In the last example note that while substituting in terms of the sum total amount of talking,
the parent talks less to child i and more to child k, thereby compensating the difference while
substituting the sum total. The pi2 = pi1 and pi2 = −pi1 lines partition the pi1, pi2 plane into four
triangles in which the (pi1, pi2) pairs correspond to compensation of differences and substitution of
the sum total (the west triangle), reinforcement and substitution (the south triangle), reinforce-
ment and complementarity (the east triangle), and compensation and complementarity (the north




2 = S where S is fixed. (pi1, pi2) pairs on a circle
with a larger radius
√
S correspond to a stronger overall parental response to changes in children’s
prosocial values. Moving around a circle of radius
√
S, we hold the overall strength of response
constant while moving to (pi1, pi2) pairs with different relative strength of compensation-versus-
reinforcement and different relative strength of substitution-versus-complementarity.
In quadrant 4 (pi1 < 0 and pi2 > 0), compensation is relatively strong compared to the com-
pensatory (pi1, pi2) pairs on the same
√
S-circle but in quadrant 1 (pi1 > 0, pi2 > 0, and pi2 > pi1)
or quadrant 3 (pi1 < 0, pi2 < 0, and pi2 > pi1). At pi2 = −pi1 in quadrant 4 compensation is the
strongest: in response to a one-unit increase in the prosocial values of child i the parent would
decrease talking to child i by the same amount she increases talking to child k, so that the differ-




S-circle. Conversely, at pi2 = −pi1 in quadrant 2, reinforcement is the strongest. In
quadrant 3 cultural substitution is relatively strong: both pi1 and pi2 are negative, implying that
the parent responds to exogenous increases in her children’s prosocial values by taking less about
giving to both children. At pi2 = pi1 in quadrant 3, substitution is the strongest. At pi2 = pi1 in
quadrant 1, complementarity is the strongest.
The pi1, pi2 plane also can be partitioned into regions characterized by different directions of
bias in bT and bJT , following from straightforward inspection of equations (9) and (15). For (pi1, pi2)
pairs in the region northwest of the pi2 = pi1 line, but to the right of the pi2 axis, b
T is positively
biased and bJT negatively biased. Moving to the left of the pi2 axis but staying to the north of the
pi2 = pi1 line (in quadrant 3) is the region in which both b
T and bJT are negatively biased. South of
the pi2 = pi1 line in quadrant 3 and to the left of the pi2 axis is the region in which b
T is negatively
biased and bTJ positively biased. In the remaining region comprising all of quadrant 2 and half of
quadrant 1 both bT and bTJ are positively biased.
Finally, the pi1, pi2 plane can be partitioned into regions in which the magnitude of the bias in
either bT or bJT is smaller. To see this, compare the bias magnitudes from equations (9) and (15).
If both bias terms are positive (pi1 > 0, pi1 − pi2 > 0) or both negative (pi1 < 0, pi1 − pi2 < 0) then:











where R ≡ σ2u
σ2θ
. The equality in the right-hand part of (17) defines the (pi1, pi2) pairs at which
the bias magnitudes are the same, the equal bias boundaries. In this case the boundaries can be
expressed parsimoniously: pi2 = 0 and pi
2
1 − pi22 = R, a hyperbola. If the bias terms have different
signs then the equal bias boundary is the solution to:
pi32 − (2pi1)pi22 + (3pi21 +R)pi2 − 2pi1(pi21 +R) = 0 (18)
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In this case the equal bias boundary is the real root of the cubic equation (18) in which the
parameters are functions of pi1. There is only one real root (the discriminant is positive), but the
solution of pi2 in terms of pi1 is not parsimonious.
3 We have graphed the equal bias boundaries in
Figure 1. The regions of the pi1, pi2 plane in which the magnitude of the bias in b
T (bJT ) is smaller
are denoted “T” (“JT”).
Note that the circle pi21 + pi
2
2 = R benchmarks the overall strength of parental response. For




2 = R, the time-varying portion of the parental variation in verbal
socialization is equally split between the component describing variation in response to changes in











2 > R imply that variation in response to changes in children’s
prosocial values accounts for more than half of the total variation in the time-varying components.
Pairs such that pi21 + pi
2
2 < R imply relatively weaker overall strength of parental response, so that
response to changes in children’s prosocial values accounts for less than half of the total variation.
We will use Figure 1 to organize our discussion of the estimates. Qualitative assumptions
about (a) compensation-versus-reinforcement, (b) substitution-versus-complementarity, and (c)
the overall strength of parental response serve as identifying assumptions that, along with the
estimation results, lead to bounds for the causal effect of verbal socialization on children’s giving.
Of course, a set of quantitative assumptions—precise values for pi1 and pi2—could be used to
develop an estimator that would be consistent for β, as long as the precise pi1 and pi2 values
actually matched the data generating process. This is what individual fixed effects and sibling fixed
effects estimators do. The difference over time between siblings estimator imposes a quantitative
identifying assumption that pi2 = pi1, and if that matches the data generating process then b
JT


































is consistent for β. Figure 1 helps visualize how strong the pi2 = pi1 identifying assumption is
in terms of the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission literatures: the assumption
implies that parents neither compensate nor reinforce exogenous changes in the difference between
their children’s prosocial values, and treat exogenous changes in the sum total of their children’s
values as either the strongest possible complements or the strongest possible substitutes in relative
terms holding pi21 + pi
2




2 = S. The individual fixed effects estimator imposes a
different quantitative identifying assumption: pi1 = 0. From Figure 1 we see that pi1 = 0 implies
moderately strong compensation combined with moderately strong complementarity (the positive
pi2 axis), or moderately strong reinforcement and moderately strong substitution (the negative pi2
axis). Again, “strength” is to be understood in relative terms.4
Many economists familiar with the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission liter-
atures would be uncomfortable with tightly holding to the quantitative identifying assumptions
underlying either the difference over time between siblings or individual fixed effects estimators.
In the Discussion section we develop arguments favoring identifying assumptions in which parents
compensate differences between their children’s prosocial values and treat exogenous changes in the
sum total of their children’s values as substitutes, that is, the west triangle in Figure 1. Whether
the reader agrees with these arguments or not, we can use Figure 1 as a tool to help understand
how the bT and bJT estimation results in combination with qualitative identification assumptions
rooted in constructs from the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission literatures lead
to bounds on the causal effect of verbal socialization.
4To be clear, by “relative” we mean relative to other (pi1, pi2) pairs on the same
√
S-circle. Pairs (0, pi2) have
moderately strong compensation/complementarity (if pi2 > 0) or moderately strong reinforcement/substitution (if
pi2 < 0) relative to other (pi1, pi2) pairs on the same
√
S-circle. By “moderately strong” we mean that (a) the
(0, pi2) pairs on the
√
S-circle are midway between zero compensation (on the pi2 = pi1 line) and the strongest
compensation (on the pi2 = −pi1 line) combined with (b) being midway between zero complementarity (on the
pi2 = −pi1 line) and the strongest complementarity (on the pi2 = pi1 line), or (c) midway between zero reinforcement
and the strongest reinforcement combined with (d) zero substitution and the strongest substitution. If S is small




We estimate different model specifications of children’s giving using data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child Development Supplement (CDS). The first wave of the
CDS was fielded in 1997 and drew its sample children from PSID-responding family units. From
each family unit up to two children aged 0-12 were selected, and interviews were completed for
3,563 children. The CDS–2 sample consists of 2,907 of these children who were in PSID-responding
family units in 2001, and the CDS–3 sample consists of 1,506 children in responding family units
in 2005. CDS–2 interviews occurred fall 2002 to spring 2003 when the children were ages 5-19,
and CDS–3 interviews occurred fall 2007 to spring 2008 when the children were ages 10-19. The
CDS sample has gotten smaller over time as the 1997 age 0-12 cohort ages out to become sample
for the PSID’s Transition into Adulthood (TA) survey or the PSID core family interview.
In CDS–2 and CDS–3 children ages 8 and older were asked the question “Did you give some of
your money last year–if only a few pennies–to a church, synagogue, or another charity that helps
people who are not part of your family?” Answers to this question form our dependent variable.
The child’s primary care giver, usually the child’s mother, was asked a parallel question “Do you
ever talk to (CHILD) about giving some of (his/her) money–if only a few pennies–to a church,
synagogue, or another charity?” Answers to this question form our verbal socialization indicator.
Data on giving to religious congregations and charitable organizations from the PSID’s 2001-
2007 core family interviews form our role-modeling variables. To match the child giving and verbal
socialization variables, our main role-modeling variable is an indicator of whether the parent gave
to a religious congregation in which the primary purpose is worship and spiritual development or
a “secular” charity whose primary purpose is to help people in need, provide health care, provide
education, youth and family services, improve neighborhoods, provide international aid, etc. Our
main role-modeling variable uses this indicator from the 2001 and 2007 waves. For sensitivity
analyses we construct alternative mappings of the core interview giving data to role-modeling
variables: (a) separate indicators for religious giving and secular giving, and (b) amounts given (in
logs). We also use the 2003 and 2005 waves, along with 2001 and 2007, to attempt to capture what
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might be long-term changes in role-modeling. We will describe this “long-term change” measure
when we present the sensitivity analysis.
We work with three analysis samples. Table 1 presents their weighted descriptive statistics.
The first sample, the child fixed effects sample, consists of 936 children who were old enough in
CDS–2 to have been asked the giving question, and young enough in CDS–3 to have not aged out.
The descriptive statistics pool the observations from both time periods. The average age of the
children is 13.2 years, aging from 10.7 in CDS–2 to 15.7 in CDS–3. Forty-seven percent are girls,
and 17 percent African-American. The percentage of children who give is 71.4, 71.8 percent of
parents talk to their child about giving, and 68.4 percent role-model giving.
The remaining rows describe the other independent variables: family structure, residential
moves, family income, and the child’s income (from allowances and jobs) and savings. The warmth
variable is the parent’s report of seven items on a 0-4 scale about how often in the past month
she told the child she loved him/her, told the child she appreciated something he/she did, spent
time with the child doing one of his/her favorite activities, talked with the child about matters
important to him/her, etc. (warmth = 0 is “not in the past month” and warmth = 4 is “every
day”). The 2.666 indicates that on average the parent provides these indicators of warmth between
once a week (warmth = 2) and several times a week (warmth = 3). We include parental warmth
because of the prominent role it plays in developmental psychology theory about prosocial behavior
(e.g., Eisenberg et al. 2006, p. 666). The reading score is the combined WJ-R Letter-Word and
Passage Comprehension Tests, and the math score is the child’s achievement on the Woodcock-
Johnson Revised (WJ-R) Applied Problems Test. Both scores are age-standardized. We include
measures of the child’s cognitive ability as proxies for the ability to engage in more abstract moral
reasoning, which in turn is associated with charitable giving (Wilhelm and Bekkers 2010).
Column 2 describes the sibling fixed effects sample. The sample consists of 576 sibling pairs
(1,152 children) in which both children were old enough in CDS–2 to have been asked the giving
question. A sibling pair is defined to be two children who share at least one parent in common.
Most of the sibling pairs share both parents (78 percent) or otherwise have a common birth mother
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(another 20 percent). Column 3 describes the across-time sibling fixed effects sample consisting of
an older sibling in CDS–2 and a younger sibling in CDS–3. Finally, among the 576 sibling–pairs
in column 2 there are 144 in which both siblings are present in CDS–2 and CDS–3. We use this
sample in our difference over time between siblings model. We also estimated sibling fixed effects
models for the 337 sibling pairs in CDS–3, but we do not present the results because they are
qualitatively similar to results from the CDS–2 sibling sample.
Table 2 describes the amount of within-variation in the three analysis samples: Panel A for
the child fixed effects sample, Panel B for the sibling fixed effects sample, and Panel C for the
across-time sibling fixed effects sample. The statistics are not weighted. Panel A contains the 903
children to be used in the child fixed effects model (the few children with missing data in one of the
two years are excluded). There is a lot of within-child across-time variation in children’s giving,
parent’s talking, and role-modeling: 39, 35, and 29 percent of the total variation is within-child.
This is more than the across-time variation in log family income (21 percent). Panel A also shows
that 13.4 percent of children switch off giving, while 17.7 switch on. Hence, 31 percent of children
switch from giving to not giving or vice versa. Twenty-eight percent of parents switch from talking
to not talking or vice versa, and 26.8 percent switch role-modeling.
Panel B shows an amount of within-sibling variation in giving (38 percent) similar to Panel
A’s within-child variation. However, there is much less within-sibling variation in parent’s talking
about giving. Only 12.9 percent of parents talked to one sibling but not the other about giving.
This suggests that there will be lower precision in the estimates of the sibling fixed effects model.
Panel C shows much more within-sibling variation in parent’s talking about giving, because the
talking is occurring at different times in this sibling sample: 27.8 percent of parents talked to one
sibling but not the other about giving. The within-sibling variation in Panel C is similar to the
within-child variation in Panel A.
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5 Empirical Results
Table 3 presents estimates of a linear probability model of children’s giving using the child fixed
effects sample. The estimates in this and subsequent tables are unweighted.5 Columns 1 and 2
are OLS estimates pooling the data from the two time periods. The specification in column 1
contains only the parental socialization actions. Both actions are associated with the children’s
giving: talking about giving is associated with a 13.5 percentage point increase in the probability
of giving and role-modeling with a 6.2 point increase. Both associations are precisely estimated.
Column 2 adds controls for demographics, resources, parental warmth, and children’s cognitive
ability. The talking about giving and role-modeling associations are little changed. Among the
controls, girls, African-American children, and those with higher math ability are more likely to
give. Children in female-headed households are less likely to give. Columns 3 and 4 present the
child fixed effects estimates. The estimated effect of talking about giving is roughly 13 percentage
points on children’s probability of giving. In contrast the estimated effect of role-modeling is
essentially zero.
Table 4 presents the sibling fixed effects estimates. Columns 1 and 2 use the sample in which
siblings were surveyed at the same time in CDS–2. When sibling fixed effects are included, the
estimated effect of talking about giving falls to 2.7 percentage points and is not significantly
different from zero. The estimate falls closer to zero upon the addition of the controls. Among the
control variables, girls are 11.4 percentage points more likely to give than boys. It is not possible
to identify role-modeling effect in this specification because almost all sibling pairs are living in
the same family unit and consequently each in the pair receives the same role-model. Results from
siblings surveyed at the same time in CDS–3 are similar, except that girls are not more likely to
give (not shown but available upon request).
In the difference over time between siblings specification in columns 3 and 4, the estimated effect
5Estimates of the parent talking and role-modeling coefficients in Table 3 using the weights produces qualitatively
similar results. For example, in column 4 the estimates are .103 (.046) and .004 (.052) respectively. For the sibling
models, it is not clear which child’s weight from the two available in each sibling pair should be used. Therefore to
maintain uniformity of presentation across the tables we present the unweighted results.
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of talking about giving becomes negative and larger in magnitude, but is imprecisely estimated.
Columns 5 and 6 use the sibling pairs in which one sibling is surveyed in CDS–2 and the other sibling
in CDS–3: the across-time sibling fixed effects specification. In this specification the estimated
effect of talking about giving is positive and the order of magnitude is similar to that in the child
fixed effects specification. A role-modeling effect can be estimated in the across-time sibling fixed
effect specification, but the estimated effect is negative and insignificant.
From the perspective of the robust role-modeling results in the experimental literature, the
absence of a significantly positive role-modeling effect in the child fixed effects and across-time
sibling fixed effects specifications is surprising. A possible explanation is measurement error. One
approach to address the measurement error problem would be to ask the children what they know
about their parents’ giving. Unfortunately, the CDS did not include such questions. The best we
can do is to consider alternative mappings of the available parental giving data to form alternative
role-modeling variables. Table 5 contains the results using the child fixed effects sample. All
specifications include the additional controls although the coefficients of socialization actions are
the only estimates presented. Column 1 repeats the baseline specification from Table 3 column 4.
In column 2 the parental giving data from the PSID 2003 and 2005 waves are used, along with the
2001 and 2007 waves, to build a role-modeling variable intended to capture more long-term changes
in parental giving. To fix ideas, a 0011 pattern (the parents do not give in 2001 and 2003 but do
give in both 2005 and 2007) is mapped to a 0→1 indicating that the role-model “turns on.” While
this is no different than how the 0011 parental giving data would have been mapped to the role-
modeling variable in the baseline specification, in column 2 a 1000 is mapped to a 0→0 indicating
the role-model was “always off.” The idea is that the 1000 may indicate parents who, for the most
part, do not give and that mapping that pattern to a 1→0 as done in the baseline specification
introduces a false transition. Similarly, a 1110 pattern is mapped to a 1→1 indicating the role-
model was always on. The full details of the mapping are available in the Appendix. Although
the column 2 mapping is somewhat ad hoc, it does provide one approach to check measurement
error. The estimated role-modeling effect in column 2 is negative and insignificant.
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Column 3 contains results from a second alternative mapping. We go back to using just the
2001 and 2007 waves for the parental giving data, but split those data to form separate indicators
of whether parents give to religious congregations and to secular charitable organizations. The
estimated effects of both indicators are small in magnitude and not significant. Column 4 adds
the separate log amounts given to consider a mapping in which the size of the amount given
drives the role-modeling effect, but once again the estimates are small and not significant. A
similar specification adding the log total (religious plus secular) amount given also produces a
small, insignificant role-modeling estimate (not shown in the table). In summary, none of the
alternative formations of role-modeling variables we tried altered the qualitative result from the
baseline specification.
Table 6 presents results from the child fixed effects specification estimated separately for four
gender-by-race subsamples. Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2011) found gender differences in their cross-
sectional results, and there are some gender and race differences already emerging in Tables 3
and 4. The results in Table 6 indicate very large effects of parents talking about giving among
African-American girls and non-African-American boys. There is a large role-modeling effect
among non-African-American girls. Both the talking about giving and role-modeling effects are
positive among African-American boys, but smaller in magnitude with standard errors roughly the
same magnitude as the point estimates.
6 Discussion
We begin by discussing the verbal socialization results. The child fixed effects and across-time
sibling fixed effects estimates (bˆT and ˆbJDT ) suggest that talking to children about giving increases
the probability that children give by .13. The sibling fixed effects and difference over time between
siblings estimates (bˆJ and ˆbJT ) are not significantly different from zero at conventional levels; as-
suming that β ≥ 0 these insignificant estimates imply β ≈ 0, that is, to imply that talking to
children about giving has zero causal effect. There are two inferences that can be drawn from
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these four estimates regardless of identifying assumptions one makes about parental compensa-
tion/reinforcement and cultural substitution/complementarity. First, parents neither compensate
nor reinforce differences between their children’s prosocial endowments, that is γ1 = γ2. Two sep-
arate results lead to this conclusion: (a) bˆJ = ˆbJT and comparing the right-hand sides of equations
(14) and (15) and (b) bˆT = ˆbJDT and comparing equations (9) and (16).6 Second, and in contrast,
parents do socialize child i differently depending upon time-varying changes in child k’s prosocial
values, that is pi2 6= 0. This is implied by the result that bˆT 6= ˆbJT and comparing equations (9)
and (15).
The implication of pi2 6= 0 is that it is necessary to use the identification framework based on the
intra-household allocation and cultural transmission models developed in Section 3 to draw causal
inferences from the estimates. We organize our discussion of the inferences that can be drawn from
the identification assumptions and the estimates according to the triangles in Figure 1. We begin
with the west triangle where the identification assumptions are that parents compensate changes
in the difference between their children’s prosocial values and that parents view the socialization
actions of others as cultural substitutes. Recall that for all (pi1, pi2) pairs in this triangle both b
T and
bJT are negatively biased. This implies plim bT , plim bJT ≤ β. The west triangle is further divided
into two sets where either (a) the magnitude of bias(bJT ) is smaller, hence plim bT < plim bJT ≤ β
or (b) bias(bT ) is smaller, hence plim bJT < plim bT ≤ β. The former is incompatible with our
estimates, but the latter is compatible. It follows that holding identifying assumptions of parental
compensation combined with cultural substitution leads to an inference from the estimates that
the causal effect of talking to children about giving is bounded from below by .13.
Continuing with the south triangle, the identification assumptions are that parents reinforce
changes in the difference between their children’s prosocial values and that parents view the so-
cialization actions of others as cultural substitutes. These assumptions are incompatible with the
6The argument that the evidence implies γ1 − γ2 = 0 is somewhat more involved because while γ1 − γ2 = 0 is a
sufficient condition for bJ = bJT and for bT = bJDT , it is not a necessary condition. Specifically, it can be shown
that the alternative to γ1 − γ2 = 0 that would also imply bJ = bJT is: γ1 − γ2 = (pi1 − pi2) + σ2u/[(pi1 − pi2)σ2θ ].
Likewise γ1 − γ2 = [(pi21 + pi22)σ2θ + σ2u]/(pi1σ2θ) would also imply bT = bJDT . However, if both of these alternatives
were true, then pi1 and pi2 would have to satisfy [R− (pi21−pi22)]×pi2 = 0. Then equation (17) would imply bT = bJT ,
which is not compatible with our estimates.
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estimates. The quadrant 3 portion of the triangle is ruled out because there the bias(bT ) is negative
and the bias(bJT ) is positive—plim bT < β < plim bJT—but this is contradicted by the estimation
result that bˆT > ˆbJT . In the quadrant 2 portion of the south triangle, both biases are positive and
bT is the least biased estimator—β < plim bT < plim bJT—but again this is contradicted by the
result bˆT > ˆbJT .
In the east triangle the identification assumptions are reinforcement combined with cultural
complementarity, and both bT and bJT are positively biased. The two areas in the east triangle
in which bT is the least biased estimator are ruled-out because in these areas β < plim bT <
plim bJT but again bˆT > ˆbJT . This leaves the two areas in which bJT is the least biased estimator.
The identification assumptions in these areas are either (a) relatively weak reinforcement but
relatively strong cultural complementarity (pi1 > 0, pi2 > 0) or (b) relatively strong reinforcement
but relatively weaker cultural complementarity (pi1 > 0, pi2 < 0) plus overall strong parental
responsiveness to changes in their children’s prosocial values (pi21 + pi
2
2 > R). If either assumption
(a) or (b) is held, bJT is if anything positively biased. Consequently the inference from ˆbJT being
insignificantly different from zero would be that there is zero causal effect of talking to children
about giving. The same inference follows from the identification assumptions at the northern edge
of the east triangle (the pi1 = pi2 line): parents neither compensate nor reinforce differences that
arise because of changes in their children’s prosocial values (the sibling fixed effects estimator is
unbiased) and parents view the socialization actions of others as very strong cultural complements.
In the north triangle the identification assumptions are compensation combined with cultural
complementarity. In the quadrant 1 portion of the triangle consider (pi1, pi2) pairs along a circle of
radius
√
S. The (pi1, pi2) pairs on the circle closer to the pi1 = pi2 line correspond to relatively weak
compensation but relatively strong cultural complementarity. Also, for all the (pi1, pi2) pairs on
the circle (in quadrant 1), bias(bJT ) is negative and bias(bT ) is positive: plim bJT < β < plim bT .
At pi1 = pi2 the estimator b
JT is unbiased. Moving counterclockwise on the circle from where the
circle intersects the pi1 = pi2 line, the (pi1, pi2) pairs are those for which bias(b
T ) > bias(bJT ). When
the circle intersects the equal bias boundary bias(bT ) = bias(bJT ). Continuing counterclockwise
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0 < |bias(bT )| < |bias(bJT )| until the pi2 axis is reached, at which bT is unbiased (because pi1 = 0).
Replacing the probability limits with the estimates, the counterclockwise movement along the
circle implies values of β from zero (at pi1 = pi2) to .13 (at the pi2 axis) with β = .065 at the equal
bias boundary (because at the boundary β must be in the middle of the two estimates). Hence,
identifying assumptions that parents compensate changes in their children’s prosocial values, but
relatively weakly, and that parents view the socialization actions of others as relatively strong
cultural complements, lead to an inference from the estimates that β is bounded by [0, .13],
with values in the lower part of this interval implied by relatively weaker compensation/stronger
complementarity.
Continuing on the circle but entering the quadrant 4 portion of the north triangle the (pi1, pi2)
pairs correspond to relatively stronger compensation and relatively weaker cultural complemen-
tarity. Also, for all the (pi1, pi2) pairs both b
T and bJT are negatively biased, and the magnitude of
bias(bT ) is smaller: plim bJT < plim bT ≤ β. Hence, identifying assumptions of relatively strong
compensation and relatively weak complementarity leads to the inference that β is bounded from
below by .13.
To summarize, in order to infer that there is zero causal effect of talking to children about giving,
it would be necessary to maintain an identifying assumption of cultural complementarity in the
socialization of giving. More precisely, it would be necessary to maintain that there is either (a)
strong cultural complementarity plus reinforcement of within-sibling changes in prosocial values—
or if not reinforcement only very weak compensation, or (b) weaker complementarity but which
is necessarily combined with strong reinforcement of within-sibling changes plus overall strong
parental responsiveness to the changes. In contrast, inferring a positive causal effect requires an
identifying assumption of either (c) cultural substitution or (d) complementarity combined with
stronger (than in (a)) compensation of within-sibling changes in prosocial values. The pattern of
estimates rules out substitution combined with reinforcement. Therefore, the cultural substitution
identifying assumption, combined with the pattern of estimates, implies compensation of changes
in the difference between children’s prosocial values. The inference that follows would be that the
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causal effect of talking to children about giving is bounded from below by .13. A positive causal
effect also would follow from cultural complementarity as long as compensation was not too weak.
Moving to the role-modeling results, the child fixed effects estimates taken at face value imply
a zero causal effect of role-modeling. The face value interpretation has some credibility because it
is the child fixed effects specification (as well as the difference over time between siblings specifica-
tion) that provides the empirical basis for inferring a positive causal effect of verbal socialization.
Nevertheless, there are three counter-arguments. First, if a parent views exogenous changes in her
child’s prosocial values as substitutes for her own role-modeling then bias(bT ) would be negative,
and bˆT ≈ 0 would be compatible with a positive role-modeling effect. However, a parent’s giving
likely is influenced by many considerations other than changes in her child’s prosocial values. If so
then the magnitude of pi1 for the role-modeling action likely is smaller than the magnitude of pi1
(and pi2) for the talking action, implying that any biases in b
T for role-modeling would be smaller
than for talking. Taking the position that a parent’s giving is strongly influenced by changes in her
child’s prosocial values also would imply a strongly instrumental view of giving narrowly focused
on children’s socialization.
The second counter-argument is that the role-modeling estimate could be biased toward zero
by measurement error. We examined numerous alternative ways to construct the role-modeling
variable, and for all of them bˆT was not significantly different from zero. It could be that all these
alternative constructions suffer from a kind of measurement error that children do not know what,
or even whether, parents are giving, so that even though a role-model is transmitted by parents it
is not seen by children. This kind of measurement error could explain the bˆT ≈ 0 result, but carries
with it an important substantive implication: parents are wasting a potentially effective way to
raise charitable children by not taking steps to ensure their role-model of giving is seen by their
children. Furthermore, for non-African-American girls role-modeling is estimated to have a large,
statistically significant positive effect. This result works against a measurement error argument,
and is in itself of substantive interest.
The third counter-argument is that it could be that regular parental giving across the years
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has a role-modeling effect in raising children who themselves become regular givers. That there
is a strong association between regular parent giving and regular child giving in the child fixed
effects sample supports this conjecture.7 Unfortunately, data that could be used to estimate the
relationship between changes in parents’ regular giving and their children’s regular giving do not
exist. It is important to point out that, if the causal effect of role-modeling resides in parents
modeling regular giving, this is not the kind of role-modeling effect measured by the laboratory
experiments in developmental psychology.
Although this paper has made important progress in estimating the effects of verbal socializa-
tion and role-modeling, there are questions that remain unanswered. An important question is
about the nature of the talking the parents are doing. For instance, most experiments have found
that empathy-based, other-oriented induction—emphasizing to the child the positive effect giving
will have on the emotional well-being of people to be helped—has a positive effect on children’s
giving (Dlugokinski and Firestone 1974; Eisenberg-Berg and Geisheker 1979; Grusec et al. 1978).
However, we do not know how frequently parents use other-oriented induction compared to, say,
conversations that are duty-based (e.g., “giving is the right thing to do”) or self-based (e.g., “if
you give you will feel good”). Another important question is about the effectiveness of verbal
socialization and role-modeling on children’s separate giving to secular organizations and religious
congregations, and on the amounts children give. Data do not exist to investigate either the nature
of talking question or the questions about disaggregated children’s giving. Collecting such data is
an important direction for future research.
Finally, if we had some evidence about pi1 and pi2, even their signs, we would be able to rule out
additional identifying assumptions as incompatible with the evidence about verbal socialization.
This also is an important topic for future research. Until then we draw our conclusions based on
the identifying assumption we think is most reasonable: that parents treat the socialization actions
of others as cultural substitutes. We favor this identifying assumption for two reasons that draw on
core arguments from the intra-household allocation and cultural transmission literatures. Drawing
7In a specification that follows Table 3 column 2, the probability that the child gives in both years is 12.6
percentage points higher (s.e. = .041) if the parent gives in three or four years out of 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007.
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on the intra-household allocation literature, assuming that the uses of parental time to achieve
other socialization goals are normal goods, a Becker and Tomes (1979) family income argument
implies that when a child’s prosocial values increase because of the socialization of others, the
parent will reduce her socialization of giving somewhat so that she can spend more time achieving
other socialization goals. The counter-assumption of complementarity would require either that
some other uses of parental time are non-normal goods, or perhaps a bounded rationality argument
that increases in the child’s prosocial values bring the goal of socializing giving to the forefront
of the parent’s mind and she in turn talks more about giving to her child. Drawing on the
cultural transmission literature, that giving is heterogeneous in the population suggests cultural
substitution, or at a minimum cultural complementarity that is not strong. In addition, the
cultural substitution identifying assumption combined with the pattern of estimates implies that
parents compensate within-sibling changes in prosocial values, consistent with thinking in child
development about parental responses to within-sibling differences (Thomas and Chess 1977).
Under an identifying assumption of cultural substitution, or weak cultural complementarity, the
estimates imply that the causal effect of verbal socialization on the probability that children give
to charity is at least .13.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides the first estimates of the effects of verbal socialization and role-modeling on
children’s charitable giving based on nationally-representative data from children in their home
settings. A second contribution is that we develop a framework useful for identifying causal
effects of parental socialization or investment actions on children’s outcomes when there is time-
varying unobserved heterogeneity in the outcome equation correlated with the actions parents
take. The framework shows how bounds on the causal effects of parent socialization actions can
be inferred from within-child and within-siblings estimates combined with identifying assumptions
about how parents respond to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. The identifying assumptions
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are characterized using constructs from the well-known economic literatures on intra-household
allocation and cultural transmission.
Applying this framework to parental socialization of children’s charitable giving, the pattern
of estimates indicates that parents socialize a child differently depending upon changes in his/her
sibling’s prosocial values. Under the identifying assumption we think is most reasonable—that
parents treat the socialization actions of others as cultural substitutes—our estimates imply that
talking to children about giving raises the probability they give by at least .13. Surprisingly,
in light of the developmental psychology experiments, our estimates based on the full sample of
children indicate no evidence that parents’ role-model of giving has a causal effect on children’s
giving.
However, when we examine demographic sub-groups of children we find that role-modeling
increases the probability that non-African-American girls give to charity by .14. The effect of
talking about giving also differs by demographic group: .07 (not statistically significant) for non-
African-American girls, .18 for African-American girls and .22 for non-African-American boys.
The estimated effects of verbal socialization and role-modeling are positive for African-American
boys (.08 and .06) but not statistically significant. To our knowledge these are the first estimates,
even among results from the experimental papers, of the effectiveness of verbal socialization and
role-modeling separately by demographic group.
The results have three implications. First, parents whose goal is to raise charitable children
should continue, not curtail, conversations about giving as their children age through adolescence.
This is important because in our child fixed effects sample, 16 percent of the children have parents
who stopped talking to them about giving as the children got older. Second, translational research
is needed to learn how role-modeling, known to be effective in the laboratory, can be used effectively
in the home. Finally, the identification framework we develop is generally applicable in applications
having child and sibling fixed effects data that include measurement of parents’ socialization and/or
investment actions. Data on socialization/investment actions of those other than parents, or
proxies for these actions, are necessary to further narrow down the range of intra-household and
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cultural transmission identifying assumptions compatible with the estimates. In turn this would
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Alternative Specification of Role-Modeling Variable with Parental Giving Data 
from PSID 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 
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Notes: 1. On the three equal bias boundaries (blue, green, and purple) |bias(bT )|=|bias( bJT )|. 
In the shaded JT areas |bias( bT )|>|bias( bJT )|. 
In the white T areas |bias( bT )|<|bias( bJT )|. 
2. Directions of bias: 
Quadrant 1 north of the π 2=π1 line: bias( bT ) is positive and bias(bJT ) is negative. 
Quadrant 1 south of the π 2 =π1 line and Quadrant 2: bias(bT ) is positive and bias( bJT ) is 
positive. 
Quadrant 3 south of the π 2 =π1 line: bias(bT ) is negative and bias( bJT ) is positive. 
Quadrant 3 north of the π 2=π1 line and Quadrant 4: bias( bT ) is negative and bias(bJT ) is 
negative. 
3. R = σ u
2
σθ








































Giving 0.714 0.700 0.701
Parent talks about giving 0.718 0.659 0.683
Role-modeling: parent gives 0.684 0.726 0.645
13.2 13.3 13.9
(3.0) (2.8) (2.6)
Female 0.474 0.516 0.512
African-American 0.173 0.175 0.153
Intact family 0.646 0.671 0.668
Female headeda 0.218 0.196 0.199
Family moved 0.252 0.244 0.245
Family income 82.112 80.461 82.582
($1000s) (89.204) (121.914) (89.170)
Child income 0.535 0.606 0.622
($1000s) (1.408) (1.575) (1.675)
Child savings 0.4 0.387 0.53







Sample size 1,872 1,152 1,041
Number of children (col. 1) / 
sibling pairs (cols. 2 and 3)
936 576 521
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Three Analysis Samples
Age
Source: Authors' calculations from PSID and CDS samples.
Notes: 1. The sample in column 1 are those aged 8 and older in CDS-2 who where also young enough 
to still be in CDS-3.  The sample in column 2 are sibling pairs in CDS-2.   The sample in column 3 are 
sibling pairs in which the older sibling was in CDS-2 and the younger sibling was in CDS-3.  Standard 
deviations for continuous variables are in parentheses.







Parents gives Log family income
Standard deviation Total 0.444 0.448 0.484 1.136
Between-child 0.346 0.361 0.409 1.012
Within-child 0.279 0.265 0.259 0.517
Percentage of variance 
within-child
39% 35% 29% 21%
Within-child transitions 0 → 0 0.115 0.137 0.239 -
across time 1 → 0 0.134 0.164 0.138 -
0 → 1 0.177 0.116 0.130 -
1 → 1 0.574 0.583 0.493 -
Child’s giving
Parent talks 
about giving Parent gives
a Log family income
Standard deviation Total 0.449 0.463 - -
Between-sibling pairs 0.353 0.427 - -
Within-sibling pairs 0.277 0.179 - -
Percentage of variance 
within-sibling pairs
38% 15% - -
Within-sibling differencesb 0 ‒ 0 0.127 0.247 - -
1 ‒ 0 0.149 0.075 - -
0 ‒ 1 0.156 0.054 - -
1 ‒ 1 0.568 0.625 - -
Table 2. Within-Variation in the Three Analysis Samples
Panel A: Child Fixed Effects Sample
Panel B: Sibling Fixed Effects Sample
Child’s giving
Parent talks 
about giving Parent gives
a Log family income
Standard deviation Total 0.451 0.456 0.485 1.072
Between-sibling pairs 0.338 0.372 0.421 0.935
Within-sibling pairs 0.299 0.264 0.241 0.524
Percentage of variance 
within-sibling pairs
44% 34% 25% 24%
Within-sibling differences 0 ‒ 0 0.106 0.156 0.261 -
across timec 1 ‒ 0 0.177 0.144 0.127 -
0 ‒ 1 0.18 0.134 0.106 -
1 ‒ 1 0.537 0.566 0.507 -
a: Because almost all siblings reside in the same household there is virtually no within-sibling pair variation in parent’s giving.
b: The siblings are ordered so that the youngest sibling comes first.  For example, 1 ‒ 0 in column 3 means that the younger sibling gives 
but the older sibling does not in 13.4 percent of the CDS-2 sibling pairs.
c: The siblings are ordered so that the older (born first) sibling in CDS-2 comes first.  For example, 1 ‒ 0 in column 3 means that the 
older sibling gave (at the time of CDS-2) but the younger sibling did not (at the time of CDS-3) in 14.9 percent of the sibling pairs.
Source: Authors' calculations from PSID and CDS samples.
Notes: 1. Panel A contains n = 903 children who have no missing data in either year that we use to estimate the child fixed-effects 
model with all the controls. Panel B contains the n = 576 sibling pairs in the sibling fixed-effects sample (CDS-2). Panel C contains the 
n = 521 sibling pairs in the across-time sibling fixed-effects sample. The statistics are not weighted.
Panel C: Across-time Sibling Fixed Effects Sample
Parent talks about giving 0.135*** 0.119*** 0.131*** 0.128***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.036) (0.037)
Role-modeling: parent gives 0.062*** 0.064** -0.005 -0.004







Intact family 0.010 -0.087
(0.033) (0.100)
Female headed -0.060* -0.054
(0.034) (0.079)
Family moved -0.004 0.002
(0.023) (0.034)
Log family income 0.004 0.005
(0.014) (0.027)
Log child's income 0.001 -0.001
(0.014) (0.018)
Log child's savings -0.004 -0.011
(0.010) (0.012)
Parental warmth 0.004 0.013
(0.016) (0.030)
Reading score 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Math score 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Observations 1,858 1,839 1,806 1,806
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4. All regressions include a year dummy.
Table 3. Cross-sectional and Within-child Estimates of Effects of                                                  
Verbal Socialization and Role-modeling
Dependent Variable: Child's Giving
OLS Child FE
Source: Authors' calculations from PSID and CDS samples.
2. Robust standard errors clusted at individual level are in parentheses.
Notes: 1. Different numbers of observations for columns are due to missing values on some of the 
independent variables, results do not change if all the regressions are based on the smallest sample.
Parent talks about giving 0.027 0.007 -0.067 -0.120 0.142*** 0.125**
(0.074) (0.070) (0.149) (0.147) (0.048) (0.050)












Log family income 0.005
(0.035)
Log child's income 0.015 0.078* -0.015
(0.023) (0.042) (0.024)
Log child's savings 0.031 0.048 0.027
(0.019) (0.031) (0.020)
Parental warmth 0.008 0.076 0.013
(0.043) (0.081) (0.037)
Reading score 0.002 -0.005 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Math score -0.001 0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Observations 1,152 1,152 288 288 1,042 1,042
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. Different Types of Within-sibling Estimates of the Effects of                                                                                                      
Verbal Socialization and Role-modeling
Dependent Variable: Child's Giving
Sibling FE




Source: Authors' calculations from PSID and CDS samples.
Parent talks about giving 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.129***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Parent gives -0.004
(0.038)
Parent gives: alternative 
indicator -0.057
(0.058)
Parent gives to secular 
charities -0.053 0.060
(0.037) (0.106)
Parent gives to religious 
congregations 0.024 -0.021
(0.039) (0.134)
Log amount parent gives to 
secular charities -0.022
(0.019)
Log amount parent gives to 
religious congregations 0.007
(0.022)
Observations 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806
Table 5. Within-child Estimates of Effects of Verbal Socialization and            
Role-modeling with Alternative Role-modeling Variables
Dependent Variable: Child's Giving
Source: Authors' calculations from PSID and CDS samples.
3. All regressions include a year dummy.
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors clusted at individual level are in parentheses.
African-Amer. non-African-Amer. African-Amer. non-African-Amer.
girls girls boys boys
Parent talks about giving 0.184** 0.071 0.081 0.216***
(0.087) (0.066) (0.080) (0.067)
Role-modeling: parent gives -0.135 0.143* 0.065 -0.073
(0.087) (0.074) (0.071) (0.069)
Intact family -0.381** -0.106 0.213 -0.168
(0.150) (0.181) (0.216) (0.261)
Female headed -0.211* 0.107 0.117 -0.185
(0.111) (0.135) (0.186) (0.227)
Family moved 0.071 0.000 0.022 -0.055
(0.065) (0.061) (0.076) (0.062)
Log family income 0.005 -0.019 -0.006 0.030
(0.055) (0.064) (0.056) (0.040)
Log child's income 0.006 -0.052 0.021 -0.003
(0.044) (0.036) (0.037) (0.032)
Log child's savings 0.054 0.020 -0.042** -0.024
(0.034) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023)
Parental warmth -0.011 -0.004 0.077 -0.016
(0.064) (0.051) (0.053) (0.067)
Reading score -0.002 -0.006* 0.006 0.002
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Math score -0.006 0.004* 0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 376 478 420 532
3. All regressions include a year dummy.
Table 6. Within-child Estimates of Effects of Verbal Socialization and Role-modeling         
for Different Demographic Groups
Dependent Variable: Child's Giving
Source: Authors' calculations from PSID and CDS samples.
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors clusted at individual level are in parentheses.
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
